Reported judgments at District Judge level rarely attract sustained attention outside the practitioners directly involved in the proceedings. They are, of course, not binding authority and are often regarded as turning upon their own facts. Occasionally, however, a first instance decision provides something equally valuable: a principled analytical framework capable of assisting judges and practitioners faced with recurring problems for which there is little direct guidance.
In my view, FH v MH (PD12J: Parallel Criminal Proceedings) [2026] EWFC 195 (B) is such a case.
District Judge Hadley directed publication because the judgment raised issues of wider importance concerning the approach to be adopted where private law proceedings run alongside criminal proceedings arising from substantially the same allegations of domestic abuse. In particular, the court identified two increasingly common issues: first, the extent to which a parent’s maintenance of a not guilty plea should influence the Family Court’s assessment of current risk; secondly, the weight to be attached to evidence of extensive therapeutic intervention and behavioural change where criminal liability remains contested.
Those issues arise with increasing frequency. Delays within the criminal justice system mean that Crown Court trials may not take place for two or three years after the Family Court has determined findings of fact. During that period, parents are routinely encouraged, indeed expected, to undertake domestic abuse work, therapy and other rehabilitative interventions. By the time welfare is reconsidered, judges are therefore frequently confronted with a difficult question: How should a Family Court evaluate evidence of rehabilitation where the parent continues to deny criminal liability?
The answer is far from straightforward.
The danger is that the court places too much emphasis upon the criminal proceedings and loses sight of its own statutory task. Equally, there is a danger that therapeutic work is accepted uncritically without sufficient scrutiny of whether meaningful behavioural change has genuinely occurred.
The achievement of FH v MH is not that it announces a new principle of law. It does not. Rather, it demonstrates a disciplined methodology for analysing these competing considerations whilst remaining faithful to the welfare principle and Practice Direction 12J.
Whether one ultimately agrees with the outcome is almost beside the point. The real contribution of the judgment lies in the questions the court asks itself before reaching that outcome.
It is easy, with the benefit of hindsight, to regard the outcome of a reported judgment as inevitable. Nothing could be further from the truth in FH v MH.
Indeed, one of the strengths of the judgment is the court’s recognition, both expressly and implicitly that this was a genuinely difficult welfare decision.
On one side stood a compelling case advanced by the mother.
The Family Court had previously made findings of serious domestic abuse following a contested hearing. Those findings were not peripheral. They formed the foundation upon which subsequent welfare decisions had been made. Criminal proceedings concerning substantially the same allegations remained outstanding, with trial listed some considerable time in the future. The father had entered not guilty pleas and, during police interview, denied the allegations and suggested he had acted in self-defence. From the mother’s perspective, those matters fundamentally undermined any assertion that genuine insight had been achieved. She argued, that requiring her to give evidence years later in the Crown Court
Many practitioners would instinctively conclude that a continued criminal denial is inconsistent with meaningful acceptance of responsibility.
Yet the father also presented a compelling case.
Over two years since the fact find hearing, he had undertaken in excess of forty therapeutic sessions with an experienced systemic practitioner. Contact had progressed successfully from supervised to unsupervised. There had been no further incidents. CAFCASS observed exemplary parenting. Importantly, the two professional witnesses, whose views had previously differed, ultimately became aligned in their assessment that the risks identified within the findings had reduced substantially, provided appropriate safety planning remained in place.
This was therefore not a straightforward contest between denial and rehabilitation. It was a case requiring the court to reconcile two propositions which are each individually compelling.
First, that domestic abuse findings must remain central to any welfare analysis. Secondly, that rehabilitation must have genuine legal significance if courts are to encourage meaningful behavioural change. That tension is unlikely to diminish in future litigation. Indeed, it is likely to become increasingly common.
The distinction between historical findings and present risk
Perhaps the most important feature of the judgment is its insistence upon distinguishing between historical findings and present welfare. That distinction is sometimes overlooked.
A finding of domestic abuse answers one question. What happened?
It does not automatically answer the different question required by section 1 of the Children Act 1989. What level of risk exists today?
PD12J itself recognises this distinction. Once abuse has been established, the court must consider the impact of that abuse, the present risks arising from it and whether those risks can be managed safely before making child arrangements. The enquiry is therefore inherently forward-looking.
District Judge Hadley’s judgment demonstrates this approach throughout.
The historical findings remained fundamental. They were never diluted. Nor were they revisited.
However, the welfare enquiry required the court to ask whether those historical events continued to represent the same level of present and future risk after two years of therapeutic intervention, successful contact and professional assessment.
That analytical separation is important. Too often practitioners argue cases as though findings themselves determine future welfare indefinitely.
They do not. They inform risk. They do not conclude it.
Paragraph 101 – a practical framework for future cases
In my view, the lasting contribution of the judgment lies within paragraphs 101 onwards.
Rather than moving directly to conclusions, the judge begins by asking himself five questions proposed during submissions before expressly accepting that they assist the analysis of risk.
Although formulated in the context of this case, they provide a useful framework capable of application well beyond it.
Has meaningful behavioural change occurred irrespective of the criminal plea?
The first question is significant because it deliberately separates behavioural change from forensic position. It reminds practitioners that welfare is concerned with current parenting capacity rather than litigation strategy. A criminal plea may have evidential significance in some cases. It should not automatically become determinative.
What evidence demonstrates that previous risk has been addressed?
This question encourages advocates to move beyond labels. Completion of a domestic abuse programme, attendance at therapy or expressions of remorse are not ends in themselves. The court must identify what evidence demonstrates that the risks identified in previous findings have genuinely reduced. That evidence may arise from therapeutic reports, observed contact, professional assessment, absence of further incidents or changes in behaviour over time. The emphasis is properly evidential.
Has sufficient insight been demonstrated?
The judgment makes an important observation, supported by both professional witnesses, that insight is not necessarily an all-or-nothing concept. Parents may demonstrate increasing understanding of the consequences of their behaviour even where aspects of previous events remain disputed. Equally, complete admissions do not necessarily demonstrate meaningful behavioural change. The court therefore avoids reducing insight to a binary exercise.
Is the court impermissibly treating the criminal plea as evidence of continuing risk?
This may prove to be the most influential question contained within the judgment. It requires judges consciously to examine their own reasoning. That is a striking example of judicial discipline. Rather than assuming the criminal proceedings must influence welfare, the court asks whether it is allowing criminal process to displace welfare analysis. Such self-direction reflects the different functions performed by criminal and family jurisdictions.
Looking at all of the evidence, has welfare risk reduced?
Ultimately, the court returns to the only question which truly matters. Has the evidence demonstrated that safe arrangements can now be made? Everything else becomes subsidiary. This structured approach is, in my view, the principal contribution made by the judgment. It provides practitioners with a logical sequence of questions capable of assisting submissions in many future cases.
Rehabilitation must have practical meaning
A broader policy issue also emerges. The Family Court routinely encourages parents found to have perpetrated domestic abuse to undertake therapeutic intervention. Professionals devote considerable time to assisting individuals understand abusive behaviours, emotional regulation, attachment, accountability and parenting.
If, after extensive engagement, positive professional assessment and successful implementation in practice, such work carries little or no evidential weight because criminal proceedings remain outstanding, practitioners may legitimately ask what incentive exists for genuine rehabilitation.
The judgment does not suggest that therapy replaces accountability. Nor does it suggest that attendance at sessions automatically reduces risk. Rather, it recognises something more modest. Behavioural change is evidence. Evidence must be weighed. Nothing more. Nothing less.
That approach preserves the integrity of welfare decision-making whilst ensuring rehabilitation remains capable of genuine legal significance.
The role of professional evidence
Another notable aspect of the judgment concerns the treatment of professional evidence.
Considerable emphasis was placed upon the evidence of the systemic practitioner despite her not being instructed as a Part 25 expert.
The judge carefully evaluated her independence, experience and professionalism before concluding that she had not sought to advance the father’s case at the expense of child safety.
Equally significant was the evolution of CAFCASS’ position.
Initially cautious because of the not guilty plea, the Family Court Adviser under cross examination changed from reduction of contact to increasing contact and overnights. Ultimately, accepting that the focus remained behavioural change and current risk rather than the existence of criminal proceedings.
Practitioners should note that neither professional suggested criminal proceedings were irrelevant. Rather, both recognised them as one component of a broader welfare analysis. That distinction is important.
PD12J remains central
Some may wonder whether the judgment represents a relaxation of PD12J.
In my view, it does not.The judge repeatedly returned to paragraphs 36 and 37, asking whether physical and emotional safety could be secured before, during and after contact and whether appropriate safety planning remained necessary.
Indeed, one of the strengths of the judgment is that it demonstrates PD12J operating precisely as intended. Historical abuse remained central. Risk remained carefully analysed. Safety planning remained essential. What changed was the evidential assessment of whether previous risks continued to exist at the same level. That is entirely consistent with PD12J’s protective purpose.
Practical lessons for practitioners
The judgment offers several practical lessons.
For advocates representing applicants, the focus should remain upon evidence demonstrating behavioural change rather than reliance upon completion of programmes alone. For those representing respondents, arguments centred exclusively upon continued criminal denials may prove insufficient where substantial professional evidence demonstrates reduced risk. For judges, paragraph 101 provide a useful analytical checklist capable of assisting structured welfare reasoning. Perhaps most importantly, the judgment reminds all involved that welfare analysis should never become a surrogate criminal trial.
The Family Court must determine present and future welfare.
That task remains distinct.
Conclusion
FH v MH will not bind future courts. Nor does it seek to develop new legal principles.
Its significance lies elsewhere. District Judge Hadley demonstrates how a court should approach one of the most challenging issues currently facing private law children practitioners: the assessment of present risk following findings of domestic abuse where extensive rehabilitation has occurred but parallel criminal proceedings remain unresolved.
Reasonable judges may disagree with the ultimate outcome.
Indeed, that is perhaps inevitable given the unusually difficult facts.
However, the judgment’s enduring contribution lies in its methodology.
By distinguishing historical findings from present welfare, recognising the evidential value of meaningful behavioural change, carefully respecting the different functions of the criminal and family jurisdictions and, above all, identifying the questions which ought to guide judicial reasoning, the judgment provides practitioners with a coherent framework for approaching future cases.
For that reason, despite being a first instance decision, FH v MH is likely to become a useful reference point for advocates and judges dealing with the increasingly common intersection between domestic abuse findings, therapeutic rehabilitation and parallel criminal proceedings.
Whether subsequent courts ultimately follow its conclusion will depend upon the facts before them. What they may well adopt, however, is its analytical discipline. That alone makes this an important and welcome addition to the developing jurisprudence in private law children proceedings.
