High Court challenge to unlawful recall to prison successful

R (Quilligan) v Secretary of State for Justice [2025] EWHC 2592 (Admin)

In a decision handed down this morning, the High Court has quashed the unlawful recall of a prisoner to custody in March 2023, and quashed the subsequent decision of the Secretary of State for Justice (“SSJ”) refusing to revoke that recall. Philip Rule KC and Daniel Henderson acted for the successful Claimant, instructed and assisted by Andrea Storey from Albin & Co Solicitors.

The Claimant, an Irish national with no previous experience of the UK prison system, was extradited from the UK to Ireland in custody on the day before his conditional release date, rather than being released on licence in the UK as had been earlier planned. He was then released from custody in Ireland, having not been told that he would be subject to licence conditions once released, nor a licence document signed or given to him. No contact was made or attempted by Probation Services.

The Claimant returned to the UK in January 2023, where he was arrested on suspicion of being drunk and disorderly. The Probation Service was notified of the charge and then its swift discontinuance at court, but took no steps to ascertain any details of the matter. Having expressed concern that the Claimant was not in contact with Probation, the SSJ then took no steps to attempt to contact the Claimant, nor any steps to contact his family members or the Irish authorities, despite being in possession of some contact details.

Instead, the Claimant was simply recalled upon allegations that he had breached the ‘good behaviour’ condition of his licence, and failed to stay in touch with his Probation Officer. He was arrested in March 2024 and has been in custody since.

A Parole Board in December 2024 found that the Claimant’s recall was inappropriate, and that there were no reasonable grounds for believing that he had been in breach of any licence conditions, and no reasonable grounds for concluding that recall was necessary. Applying its statutory test, however, the Board declined to direct release on the basis that ongoing supervision might assist to reduce risk in the longer term, even if his risk was entirely manageable on a licence until the end of the sentence.

The Claimant then applied under section 254(2B) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 for the SSJ to revoke his recall in light of the Parole Board’s conclusions as to its unreasonableness. The SSJ refused to do so, in a single-line email in February 2025.

Judicial review proceedings were then launched. The Claimant was successful in obtaining an exceptional extension of time of over two years to challenge the original recall, and the hearing was expedited, and heard in September 2025.

In a judgment handed down today, the High Court has now concluded that the SSJ did not have reasonable grounds for believing that the Claimant had acted in breach of the second limb of the good behaviour condition, and had not fairly and lawfully considered the issue whether recall was necessary. The Claimant’s recall was found to be unlawful, and quashed. The Court also held that the SSJ had failed to provide adequate reasons for declining to revoke the recall in February 2025; and that that decision was also quashed.

The judgment also considers a number of other points of law of more general importance. Of particular note is the Court’s analysis of what is required at stage one of the well-known test derived from R (Calder) v SSJ [2015] EWCA Civ 1050 and earlier decisions, namely whether there were ‘reasonable grounds to consider that a licence condition had been breached’. The Court declined to add any further gloss to the dicta of Sir Anthony Clarke MR in R (Gulliver) v Parole Board [2007] EWCA Civ 1386, which required “evidence upon which [the SSJ] could reasonably conclude that there had been a breach”. Whilst that would not necessarily be read therefore as meaning an identifiable objective supporting basis is needed, there is a duty to establish facts with reasonable accuracy and for the information provided to the SSJ to decide whether to recall to be reasonably accurate and complete.

The judgment is also important as the first case to consider the duty to give reasons, and standard of reasons, to be applied to the SSJ’s determination whether to exercise the power under section 254(2B) to revoke a recall. The Court concluded that in the circumstances of the Claimant’s case, including the new material arising since recall, there was “a duty on the Defendant to show that he had considered this material, and what he made of it”. The SSJ had failed to do so.

Daniel Henderson settled and commenced the judicial review claim and secured permission and time extension, and Philip Rule KC and Daniel acted for the Claimant at the substantive hearing.