Important judgment on the siting of crematoria, and reminders of key principles of statutory interpretation handed down today

Today, the Supreme Court has handed down judgment in the case of Wathen-Fayed v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2025] UKSC 32. The decision concerns the interpretation of the Cremation Act 1902 (“the Act”), specifically the provisions regarding the siting of a crematorium.

The development proposed is a crematorium on a site comprising an open field in the Metropolitan Green Belt in Surrey. It includes a ceremony hall, memorial areas, a garden of remembrance and associated parking and infrastructure (“the Proposed Development”). The Secretary of State granted permission for the development in 2021.

The Appellant took issue with a proposed area of a crematorium site which is proposed to be used for the storage of ashes in structures and pillars which can incorporate urns. This is relevant because s.5 of the Act provides a locational restriction on where a “crematorium” can be sited (not within 200 yards of a dwelling house or 50 yards of a public highway) (“the radius clause”).

The central issue in the case was what fell within the definition of a “crematorium”, which is defined as “any building fitted with appliances for the purpose of burning human remains, and shall include everything incidental or ancillary thereto”. The question for the Court was whether or not the structures above fell within the radius clause restriction, thereby making the development undeliverable.

The Court agreed with the interpretation of the Respondent Secretary of State and Horizon Cremation Ltd that this is to be measured from the building which houses the crematory. The Proposed Development was therefore not constrained to be delivered.

Beyond the correct interpretation of the Act, which will be of interest to those working in the cremation sector, the case provides helpful guidance on the principles of statutory interpretation, including the use of aids to the interpretation of primary legislation, including (i) statutory guidance [59] and [96]; (ii) secondary legislation drafted at the same time as primary legislation [58]; (iii) secondary legislation drafted later [97]; (iv) settled practice [98] and (v) the presumption against absurdity [57], [78] and [79] .

Peter Goatley KC and Sioned Davies acted for the successful Interested Party, Horizon Cremation Ltd instructed by Emily Williams at Addleshaw Goddard LLP.

The full judgment can be viewed here.